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Election Attacks with Few Candidates
Yongjie Yang 1
Abstract. We investigate the parameterized complexity of strategic
behaviors in generalized scoring rules. In particular, we prove that the
manipulation, control (all the 22 standard types), and bribery prob-
lems are fixed-parameter tractable for most of the generalized scor-
ing rules, with respect to the number of candidates. Our results imply
that all these strategic voting problems are fixed-parameter tractable
for most of the common voting rules, such as Plurality, r-Approval,
Borda, Copeland, Maximin, Bucklin, etc., with respect to the number
of candidates.
1 Introduction
Voting has been recognized as a common approach for preference ag-
gregation and collective decision making whenever there exists more
than one alternative for a community to choose from. It comes with a
wide variety of applications which ranges from multi-agent systems,
political elections, recommendation systems, machine learning etc.
[24, 25, 31]. Unfortunately, due to the Gibbard-Satterthwaite theo-
rem [14, 27], any voting system which satisfies a set of desirable cri-
teria is not strategy-proof, that is, there exists a voter who can make
himself better off by misreporting his vote. To address this issue,
Bartholdi et al. [17] introduced the computational complexity to the
study of strategic voting problems. The point is that if it is NP-hard
to successfully perform a specific strategic behavior, the strategic in-
dividual(s) may give up performing such a strategic behavior. Since
then, exploring the complexity of strategic behaviors in voting sys-
tems has been one of the main focus of computational social choice
community. We refer to [1, 3, 19] for comprehensive surveys on this
topic.
Recently, this purely worst-case analysis, which ignores real-
world settings, was criticized by researchers. See [4, 12, 20, 26, 28]
for detailed discussions. For their purpose, they proposed diverse
measurements to evaluate the feasibility of strategic behaviors in
practical elections. For example, Procaccia and Rosenschein [26] in-
troduced the concept of junta distributions (generally speaking, these
are distributions over the elections that satisfy several constraints.)
and argued that if an (heuristic) algorithm often solve the manip-
ulation problem when the instances are distributed according to a
junta distribution, it would also often solve the manipulation problem
when the instances are distributed according to many other plausible
distributions.
In this paper, we study the strategic behaviors in a variety of voting
systems from the parameterized complexity perspective. The param-
eterized complexity was first systematically introduced by Downey
and Fellows [6]. Differently from the classical complexity, the pa-
rameterized complexity deals with problems in two dimensions.
More specifically, an instance of a parameterized problem consists
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of a main part and a parameter t which is normally a positive in-
teger. The main task in the parameterized complexity is to explore
how the parameters affect the complexity of the problems. It turned
out that under the framework of the parameterized complexity, many
NP-hard problems become tractable with respect to specific param-
eterizations. More precisely, many NP-hard problems turned out to
be solvable in f(t) · |I |O(1) time. Here, f is a computable function
that depends only on the parameter t. All the parameterized prob-
lems which fall into this category are called fixed-parameter tractable
(FPT for short). However, the parameters do not always behave
in this way. There are parameterized problems which do not ad-
mitFPT -algorithms unless the parameterized complexity hierarchy
collapses at some level, which is commonly believed to be unlikely.
This discussion is beyond our focus in this paper. For a comprehen-
sive understanding of parameterized complexity, we refer to the text
of Niedermeier [22]. For recent developments of parameterized com-
plexity applied to computational social choice, we refer to [1, 19].
A natural parameter in the voting scenario is the number of candi-
dates. This parameter is relatively small in some real-world settings.
For example, a political election normally contains only a few can-
didates. A reference library of preference data assembled by Mattei
and Walsh [20] also reveals such a situation. Out of their 14 sets of
election data from the real-life settings, 5 data sets contain less than
10 candidates each (September 12, 2018).
In this paper, we aim at deriving a general framework for achiev-
ing FPT results with respect to the number of candidates. To this
end, we adopt the concept of the class of generalized scoring rules
which was introduced by Xia and Conitzer [32]. In particular, we
prove that the manipulation, control (all the 22 standard types) and
bribery problems areFPT for most of the generalized scoring rules,
with respect to the number of candidates. Since many common vot-
ing rules fall into the category of the generalized scoring rules, these
tractability results hold for these voting rules, among which are all
the positional scoring rules (e.g., Borda, r-Approval, Veto, Plurality),
Copelandα, Maximin, Bucklin, Ranked pairs, Schulze, Nanson’s and
Baldwin’s.
Related Works. Hemaspaandra et al. [16] recently studied the ma-
nipulation, control and bribery problems in Schulze’s and Ranked
pairs voting systems. They proved that all these strategic problems
in Schulze and Ranked pairs voting systems are FPT with respect
to the number of candidates. Gaspers et al. [13] proved that the ma-
nipulation problem in Schulze voting system is indeed polynomial-
time solvable for any number of manipulators. Faliszewski et al. [11]
studied Copelandα control problems and achieved FPT results for
most of the control problems in Copelandα voting with respect to
the number of candidates, for every 0 ≤ α ≤ 1. Besides the manip-
ulation, (22 standard forms of) control and bribery problems, many
other strategic voting problems were also studied from the parame-
terized complexity perspective by researchers. Faliszewski et al. [9]
studied a multimode control problem (in this model, the strategy indi-
viduals are allowed to add votes, delete votes, add candidates, delete
candidates, and change votes simultaneously) and proved that this
problem is FPT with respect to the number of candidates for vot-
ing rules which are integer-linear-program implementable. Dorn and
Schlotter [5] proved that the swap bribery problem is FPT with re-
spect to the number of candidates for any voting system which is de-
scribed by linear inequalities. Betzler et al. [2] proved that the possi-
ble winner problem isFPT with respect to the number of candidates
for Maximin, Copeland and Ranked pairs voting rules. Elkind et al.
[7] devised a general framework for classifying the fixed-parameter
tractability of the winner determination problems for voting rules
which are “distance-rationalizable”. For parameterized complexity
of strategic voting problems with respect to other parameters than
the number of candidates, we refer to [1] for a survey.
2 Preliminaries
Common Rules. We follow the terminology of the work of Xia and
Conitzer [33]. Let C = {c1, ..., cm} be a set of candidates. A linear
order on C is a transitive, antisymmetric, and total relation on C. The
set of all linear orders on C is denoted by L(C). An n-voter profile
P on C consists of n votes defined by linear orders on C. That is,
P = (V1, ..., Vn), where for every i ≤ n, Vi ∈ L(C). Each vote
represents the preferences of the respective voter over the candidates.
In particular, a candidate c is ranked higher than another candidate c′
in a vote, if the voter prefers c to c′. For convenience, we also use ≻i
to denote a vote. Throughout this paper, we use the words vote and
voter interchangeably. The set of all profiles on C is denoted byP (C).
In the remainder of the paper, m denotes the number of candidates
and n denotes the number of voters. A (voting) rule is a function that
maps a voting profile to a single candidate, the winner.
• Positional scoring rules. Every candidate gets a specific score from
each vote according to the position of the candidate in the vote.
More specifically, a scoring voting rule is defined by a scoring
vector ~λ = (λ1, λ2, ..., λm) with λ1 ≥ λ2 ≥, ...,≥ λm. The can-
didate ranked in the i-th position in a vote gets λi points from this
vote. The winner is the candidate with the highest score.2 Follow-
ing are some well-known positional scoring rules.
voting rules scoring vectors
Borda (m− 1,m− 2, ..., 0)
r-Approval (1, ..., 1, 0, ..., 0) with exactly r many 1’s.
Plurality (1, 0, 0, ..., 0)
Veto (1, 1, ..., 1, 0)
• Maximin. For two candidates c and c′, let N(c, c′) denote the
number of votes which prefer c to c′. We say c beats c′ if
N(c, c′) > N(c′, c). The maximin score of a candidate c is de-
fined as minc′∈C\{c}N(c, c′). The winner is the candidate with
the highest maximin score.
• Copelandα . Each candidate is compared with every other candi-
date. In each comparison, the one which beats its rival gets one
point and its rival gets zero points. If they are tied, both get α
points. The winner is the candidate with the highest score.
• Instant-runoff (STV): If a candidate is ranked in the first position
by more than half of the votes, the candidate wins. Otherwise, the
candidate which is ranked in the first position by the least number
of votes is eliminated. This is repeated until there is a candidate
which is ranked in the first position by more than half of the votes.
2 If more than one candidate has the highest score, we break the tie by a fixed
deterministic tie-breaking rule. This applies to all the other voting rules
discussed in this paper.
Generalized Scoring Rules. In the following, we give the defi-
nition of the class of the generalized scoring rules which was intro-
duced by Xia and Conitzer [33].
Let K = {1, ..., k}. For any ~a,~b ∈ Rk, we say that ~a and ~b
are equivalent with respect to K, denoted by ~a ∼K ~b, if for any
i, j ∈ K,~a[i] > ~a[j] ⇔ ~b[i] > ~b[j] and ~a[i] < ~a[j] ⇔ ~b[i] < ~b[j]
(where ~a[i] denotes the i-th component of the vector ~a, etc.).
A function g : Rk → C is compatible with K if for any ~a,~b ∈
R
k,~a ∼K ~b⇒ g(~a) = g(~b).
Let k ∈ N, f : L(C) → Rk , and g : Rk → C where g is
compatible with K. The functions f and g determine the gener-
alized scoring rule GS(f, g) as follows. For any profile of votes
V1, ..., Vn ∈ L(C), GS(f, g)(V1, ..., Vn) = g(
∑n
i=1 f(Vi)). That
is, every vote results in a vector of scores according to f , and g de-
cides the winner based on comparisons between the total scores. Here
we call f the generalized scoring function and g the decision func-
tion. Moreover, we say that GS(f, g) is of order k and
∑n
i=1 f(Vi)
is the total score vector of the profile according to GS(f, g). For
convenience, we also use f(P ) to denote
∑n
i=1 f(Vi), where P is
the profile with the votes V1, ..., Vn.
Many common voting rules fall into the category of the general-
ized scoring rules. For example, for the Borda voting rule, the corre-
sponding generalized scoring rule is specified as follows.
kBorda = m.
fBorda(V ) = (s(V, c1), ..., s(V, cm)), where s(V, ci) is the score
of ci from the vote V .
gBorda(fBorda(P )) = argmaxi(fBorda(P )), that is, the winner
is the one with highest Borda score.
We point out that the class of generalized scoring rules also encap-
sulates many runoff voting rules, that is, voting rules where the win-
ners are determined via several rounds. A typical example is the STV
voting rule. Moreover, the definition of generalized scoring rules can
be generalized to voting rules selecting more than one winner [32].
The following lemma summarizes the common voting rules known
to fall into the category of generalized scoring rules.
Lemma 1 [21, 33] The following voting rules are generalized scor-
ing rules: all the positional scoring rules, Copelandα, Maximin, STV,
Baldwin’s, Nanson’s, Ranked pairs, Bucklin.
A common voting rule which is precluded by the class of
generalized scoring rules is the Young’s voting rule [33]. Gold-
smith et al. [15] recently studied a new class of voting rules (rank-
dependent scoring rules, RDSRs for short) and showed by an exam-
ple that there are voting rules in this class which do not fall into the
category of of the generalized scoring rules.
Strategic Behaviors. We make use of the standard definitions of
strategic behaviors in computational social choice. In the following,
we briefly introduce the problems discussed in this paper. We refer
to [8, 11] for all the detailed definitions, including the manipulation,
bribery and all the 22 standard control problems. In all these prob-
lems, we have as input a set C ∪ {p} of candidates where p is a
distinguished candidate, and a profile P = {V1, ..., Vn} of votes.
The question is whether the distinguished candidate p can become
a winner (in this case, p is not the winner in advance) or become a
loser (in this case, p is the winner in advance) by imposing a spe-
cific strategic behavior on the voting. The former case of making p a
winner is called a constructive strategic behavior, and the latter case
is called a destructive strategic behavior. Observe that if the problem
of a specific constructive strategic behavior is FPT with respect to
the number of candidates, so is the corresponding destructive case.
To check this, suppose that we have an FPT algorithm Algo for a
specific constructive strategic behavior problem. Then, we can guess
a candidate p′ ∈ C and run the algorithm Algo but with the dis-
tinguished candidate being p′. Since we have at most m guesses, the
destructive case is solved inFPT -time. Due to this fact, we consider
only the problems of constructive strategic behaviors.
Manipulation. In addition to the aforementioned input, we have
a set V ′ of voters who did not cast their votes yet. We call these
voters manipulators. The question is whether the manipulators can
cast their votes in a way so that p becomes a winner.
Bribery. The bribery problem asks whether we can change at most
κ votes (in any way but still linear orders over the candidates) so that
p becomes a winner, where κ ∈ N is also a part of the input.
Control. There are 11 standard constructive control behaviors in
total. Among them 7 are imposed on the candidate set and 4 are im-
posed on the vote set. We first discuss the candidate control cases.
In these scenarios, we either add some candidates (limited or unlim-
ited), or delete some candidates, or partition the candidate set into
two sets (runoff or non-runoff partitions with ties-promote or ties-
eliminate models). Since the number of the candidates is bounded by
the parameter m, we can enumerate all the possibilities of perform-
ing the control strategic behaviors in FPT -time with respect to m.
Thus, if the winner is computable in FPT time (which holds for all
the common voting rules studied in this paper) with respect to m, the
candidate control problems are FPT . In the following, we restrict
our attention to the vote control problems.
Deleting votes: The problem of control by deleting votes asks
whether we can remove at most κ votes from the given profile so
that p becomes the winner, where κ ∈ N is also a part of the input.
Partition votes: In the control by partitioning of votes, we are
asked the following question: is there a partition of P into P1 and
P2 such that p is the winner of the two-stage election where the
winners of election (C ∪ {p}, P1) compete against the winners of
(C ∪ {p}, P2)? We distinguish the ties-promote model and the ties-
eliminate model. In the ties-promote model, all the candidates which
are tied as winners in the first-stage election are promoted to the sec-
ond stage election. In the ties-eliminate model, if there is more than
one winner, then all these winners will not be moved to the second
stage election.
Adding votes: In addition to the aforementioned input, we have
another list P ′ of unregistered votes, and are asked whether we can
add at most κ votes in P ′ to P so that the distinguished candidate p
becomes the winner.
3 The General Framework
In this section, we investigate the parameterized complexity of strate-
gic behaviors under the class of generalized scoring rules. Our main
result is summarized in the following theorem.
Theorem 2 Let ϕ = (f, g) be a generalized scoring rule of order
k, where f is the generalized scoring function and g is the decision
function. If k is bounded by a function of the number of candidates,
and f and g are computable inFPT -time with respect to the number
of candidates, then the manipulation, bribery and all the 22 standard
control problems are FPT under ϕ, with respect to the number of
candidates.
PROOF. According to the discussion in Sec. 2, we can restrict
our attention to the constructive strategic behaviors of manipulation,
bribery, control by adding/delting/partition votes. We derive FPT -
algorithms for these problems. Our algorithms rely on the theorem
by Lenstra [18], which implies that the integer linear programming
(ILP) is FPT with respect to the number of variables. Specifically,
we reduce the instances of the stated problems to instances of ILP
with the number of variables bounded by some function in m.
Let ψ be the function in m with k ≤ ψ(m). Due to the defi-
nition of the generalized scoring rules, we need focus on at most
3(
k
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) different types of total score vectors (for each pair of subindices
i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}, we have either ~a[i] > ~a[j] or ~a[i] = ~a[j], or
~a[i] < ~a[j]). Here we say two vectors ~a,~b ∈ Rk have the same type
if they are equivalent with respect to K = {1, 2, ..., k}. Since the
decision function g is computable in FPT -time with respect to m,
we can enumerate all the types of total score vectors in the final elec-
tion (that is, elections after performing strategic behaviors) which
result in p being the winner. Each enumerated total score vector ~a
is specified by, for each pair of subindices i, j, either ~a[i] > ~a[j] or
~a[i] = ~a[j], or ~a[i] < ~a[j]. Then, we reduce the subinstances to ILP
instances. To this end, we assign variables to different types of votes
and derive restrictions to ensure that the currently enumerated total
score vector coincides with the final election. If the given instance
is a true-instance, then at least one of the total score vector leads to
a correct answer. We fix ~a as the currently enumerated total scoring
vector. In the following, we show how to reduce these instances to
ILP instances.
Manipulation. Let P = (V1, V2, ..., Vn) be the profile of non-
manipulators, and let ~b = f(P ) be the total score vector of P .
Clearly,~b can be calculated in FPT time since the generalized scor-
ing function is computable inFPT time. To reduce the manipulation
problem to ILP, we assign variables to all the m! possible linear or-
ders over the candidates, one for each. Let x≻ denote the variable
assigned to the linear order ≻. These variables indicate how many
manipulators cast their votes which are defined as ≻. Now we intro-
duce the restrictions.
(1) Let t be the number of manipulators, we have∑
≻
x≻ = t
Here, ≻ runs through all the linear orders in L(C ∪ {p}).
(2) For convenience, for each linear order ≻, we use f≻[i] instead
of f(≻)[i] to denote the i-th entry of the score vector of ≻ by the
generalized scoring function f . For each pair i, j ∈ {1, 2, ..., k}with
~a[i]− ~a[j]✄ 0, where ✄ ∈ {>,=, <} we have
~b[i] +
∑
≻
(f≻[i] · x≻)−~b[j] −
∑
≻
(f≻[j] · x≻)✄ 0
Bribery. We divide the votes into P≻1 , P≻2 , ..., P≻t with P≻i
containing all the votes defined as the linear order ≻i. For every two
distinguished linear orders≻ and≻′, we assign a variable denoted by
x≻
′
≻ , which specifies how many voters from P≻ are bribed to recast
their votes as ≻′. Clearly, we have at most m!2 variables. For each
≻, let N(≻) be the number of the votes which are defined as ≻
after changing the votes according to the variables assigned to the
instance. More precisely, N(≻) is given by
N(≻) = |P≻| −
∑
≻′ 6=≻
x≻
′
≻ +
∑
≻′ 6=≻
x≻≻′
Now we introduce the restrictions. First, we have the following
restriction since we can bribe at most κ votes in total.
∑
≻6=≻′
x≻
′
≻ ≤ κ
Here,≻ and≻′ with≻6=≻′ run through all the linear orders over the
candidates.
In addition, for each P≻, at most |P≻| can be bribed. Hence, for
each P≻, we have ∑
≻′ 6=≻
x≻
′
≻ ≤ |P≻|
Finally, for every i, j with ~a[i]−~a[j]✄ 0, where✄ ∈ {>,<,=},
we have
∑
≻
N(≻) · f≻[i]−
∑
≻
N(≻) · f≻[j] ⊲ 0
Control by Adding/Deleting Votes. We first consider the adding
votes case. We divide the unregistered votes into parts each contain-
ing all the votes defined as the same linear order. For each part con-
taining the votes defined as linear order ≻, we assign a variable x≻,
which specifies how many votes from this part are included in the
solution. Now we introduce the restrictions.
For each linear order ≻, let N1(≻) be the number of registered
votes defined as ≻, and N2(≻) be the number of unregistered votes
defined as ≻. Since we can add at most κ votes, we have the follow-
ing restriction.
∑
≻
x≻ ≤ κ
In addition, for each ≻, we have
x≻ ≤ N2(≻)
Finally, for every pair i, j with ~a[i]−~a[j]✄ 0, where ✄ ∈ {>,<
,=}, we have,
∑
≻
(x≻ +N1(≻)) · f≻[i]−
∑
≻
(x≻ +N1(≻)) · f≻[j] ⊲ 0
The algorithm for the deleting votes case is analogous.
Partition of Votes with Ties-Eliminate. This case is slightly dif-
ferent from the above cases. First observe that p has chance to be the
final winner if p is a temporary winner in at least one of the two sub-
elections. Therefor, to solve the problem, we enumerate all possible
candidates p′ which will compete with p in the second-stage elec-
tion. We immediately discard the enumerations for which p is not the
winner when competing with p′. The above procedure clearly takes
polynomial time and leads to polynomially many subinstances, each
asking whether we can partition the profile into two parts P1 and P2
so that p is the winner in the voting with profile P1, and p′ is the
winner in the voting with profile P2. Therefore, instead of enumer-
ating all the possible total score vectors as discussed for the above
controls, we enumerate all the possible vector pairs ~a,~b ∈ Rk, where
~a is the potential total score vector for the voting profile P1, and~b is
the potential total score vector for voting profile P2. We discard all
the enumerations for which p (resp. p′) is not the winner with respect
to ~a (resp. ~b). Now, we adopt the similar method as discussed above
to reduce each subinstance to an ILP instance. To this end, again we
partition the votes into parts each containing all the votes defined as
the same linear order over the candidates. We still use x≻ to denote
the variable assigned to the part P≻ of votes defined as ≻. Here, x≻
indicates how many votes in P≻ go to P1. The restrictions are as
follows. For each ≻, we have
x≻ ≤ |P≻|
For every pair i, j with ~a[i]− ~a[j]✄ 0, we have,∑
≻
(x≻ · f≻[i]) −
∑
≻
(x≻ · f≻[j]) ✄ 0
This equality is to ensure the that p is the winning candidate in the
voting with profile P1. The following equality is to ensure that p′ is
the winning candidate in the voting with profile P2.
For every pair i, j with~b[i]−~b[j]✄ 0, where ✄ ∈ {>,<,=}, we
have,
∑
≻
(|P≻| − x≻) · f≻[i]) −
∑
≻
(|P≻| − x≻) · f≻[j]) ✄ 0
The proof for the ties-promote model is similar. However, in this
case, we should adopt the multiwinner variant of the generalized
scoring rules (which is possible [32]) as a tool. Besides, instead of
enumerating a candidate p′, we need to enumerate all the pairwise
disjoint subsets C1 and C2 of the candidates, with p ∈ C1. If p is
not the winner in the election restricted to C1 ∪ C2, we discard the
enumeration at the moment. Moreover, the restrictions are derived to
making all the candidates in C1 the co-winners in the voting profile
P1, and C2 the co-winners in the voting profile P2.
To use the framework described in Theorem 2, we require that the
order of the generalized scoring rule must be bounded by a function
of the number of the candidates, and the scoring function and the
decision function must be computable in FPT time with respect to
the number of candidates. In the following, we show that both the
conditions are fulfilled for all the voting rules stated in Lemma 1.
Lemma 3 For all the positional scoring rules, Copelandα , Max-
imin, STV, Baldwin’s, Nanson’s, Ranked pairs, Bucklin, the orders
of the corresponding generalized scoring rules are bounded by func-
tions of the number of candidates, and the scoring and decision func-
tions of the corresponding generalized scoring rule are computable
in FPT -time.
PROOF. We refer to [32] for all the positional scoring rules,
STV, Maximin, Ranked pairs and Copelandα ([32] described only
for α = 0.5. However, with slight modification, the arguments work
for all the 0 ≤ α ≤ 1). In the following, we prove for the Baldwin’s,
Nanson’s and Bucklin, by describing in detail the specifications of
the respective generalized scoring rules. Hereby, let C denote the set
of candidates.
Bucklin. The Bucklin score of a candidate c is the smallest num-
ber x such that more than half of the votes rank c among the top x
candidates. The winner is the candidate that has the smallest Bucklin
score. The respective generalized scoring rule is as follows.
kBucklin = m
2; the components are indexed by pairs (c, i) where
c is a candidate and i is a positive integer with 1 ≤ i ≤ m.
The score vector of a vote ≻ is calculated in the following way.
fBucklin(≻)c,i =
{
1 if c is ranked among the top i positions in ≻
0 otherwise
The decision function gBucklin works as follows. First, sum up all
the score vectors of the votes. Let ~a be the total score vector. It is
clear that the Bucklin score of a candidate c is the minimum value i
for which ~a[c, i] > n/2, where n is the number of votes. Then, the
winner is the one with the minimum Bucklin score.
Nanson’s and Baldwin’s. These two voting rules are multiround
runoff rules, meaning that the winner is selected via rounds in each
some candidates are removed from the election. Specifically, in the
Nanson’s voting, all the candidates with Borda score no greater than
the average Borda score are eliminated in each round. In the next
round, the Borda scores of the remaining candidates are recomputed,
as if the eliminated candidates were not in the voting. This is repeated
until there is a final candidate left. The Baldwin’s is similar to the
Nanson’s with difference that in each round the eliminated candidate
is the one with least Borda score.
Xia and Conitzer [32] proved that for any voting rule with finitely
many runoff rounds, if in each step the rule used to rule out the elim-
inated candidates is also a generalized scoring rule, then the multi-
round runoff rule is a generalized scoring rule. Moreover, their (con-
structive) proof implies that if in each step the generalized scoring
rule has FPT -time computable functions f ′ and g′, with respect to
the number of candidates, the respective generalized scoring rule of
the multiruound voting rule (with polynomially many rounds) also
has a FPT -time computable functions f and g. We refer to Ap-
pendix 1 in [32] for checking further details. Due to this fact, it
is sufficient to show that in each round the procedure of selecting
the eliminated candidates is a generalized scoring rule with bounded
order, FPT -time computable decision function g and FPT -time
computable scoring function f .
We consider first for the Nanson’s voting. Let (c1, c2, ..., cm) be a
arbitrary fixed order of the candidates.
k = m.
f(V ) = (s(V, c1), ..., s(V, cm)), where s(V, ci) is the Borda
score of ci from the vote V .
The decision function g selects the winner(s) as follows. Let
avg = 1
m
·
∑m
i=1 f(P )[i]. The winners (the candidates which are
eliminated) are the candidates ci with f(P )[i] < avg.
The Baldwin’s voting is similar with the difference that the candi-
dates ci with minimum f(P )[i] are eliminated.
Based on Theorem 2 and Lemma 3, we have the following corol-
lary.
Corollary 4 All the manipulation, bribery and the 22 standard con-
trol problems for the following voting rules are FPT with re-
spect to the number of candidates: all the positional scoring rules,
Copelandα , Maximin, STV, Baldwin’s, Nanson’s, Ranked pairs and
Bucklin.
4 Discussion
The class of generalized scoring rules was first introduced by Xia
and Conitzer [32] to investigate the frequency of coalitional manipu-
lability. In this scenario, the focus is how the probability of a random
profile being manipulable changes as the number of manipulators
increases from 1 to infinite. The class of generalized scoring rules
was also used in investigating the margin of victory in voting sys-
tems [30]. Moreover, Xia and Conitzer [33] characterized the class of
generalized scoring rules as the class of voting rules that are anony-
mous and finitely locally consistent. A highly related class of voting
rules is the class of hyperplane rules introduced by Mossel et al. [21].
Mathematically, the generalized scoring rules are equivalent to the
hyperplane rules [21].
In this paper, we extend the application of generalized scoring
rules by exploring the parameterized complexity of strategic voting
problems. In particular, we show that from the viewpoint of param-
eterized complexity, the manipulation, bribery and control problems
which are NP-hard in many voting systems turned out to be fixed-
parameter tractable (FPT ), with respect to the number of candi-
dates. The key point of our FPT algorithms is the compatibility of
the decision function g in the generalized scoring rules, which en-
ables us to enumerate all the desirable total score vectors in FPT
time.
To date, many strategic problems have been proved NP-hard. A
challenging task would be to explore the connections between these
NP-hardness via the notion of the generalized scoring rules. For this
purpose, a deeper exploitation of the functions f and g is needed.
Besides, there are also many other problems in computational so-
cial choice that pertain to conducting strategic voting, some of which
were introduced quite recently [10, 23]. Exploring the parameterized
complexity of these newly proposed voting problems via the frame-
work of generalized scoring rules is also an interesting topic.
Note. Similar results of this paper were independently announced
by Xia [29]. However, there are several differences. First, our results
apply to all the 22 standard control problems, while the results in [29]
does not include the control by partition votes. Second, Xia studied
the winner determination problem which is not discussed in this pa-
per.
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